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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER IN INDONESIA AND  
THE FLYPAPER EFFECT PHENOMENON 
(EVIDENCE FROM REGENCIES / MUNICIPALITIES IN INDONESIA)  
 
By 
 
Dhani Setyawan 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to identify and analyse the impact of the 
Intergovernmental transfer (Balance Fund) and Local Own Revenue to the local 
government expenditure as well as to know the occurence of flypaper effect phenomenon 
in the relationship between those variables. Flypaper effect is a condition which the 
stimulus of local government expenditure caused by changes in central government 
transfers has a greater effect than the stimulus that caused by changes in local income. 
This study is performed in two parts, firstly, using cross section data of 188 
municipalities and regencies from 2006 to 2008, and secondly, using panel data of 484 
Regencies and Municipalities during 2001 to 2008. The Flypaper Effect phenomenon is 
measured by using data of the local government budget realization during the study 
period. The study shows that, firstly, Balance Fund and Local Own Revenue both 
partially and simultaneously have a significant impact on Local Government Expenditure. 
Second, the effect of Balance Fund on Local Expenditure is stronger than the effect of 
Local Own revenue. This proves the non occurence of flypaper effect phenomenon in the 
local government response to the central government transfer fund. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background 
The practice of regional autonomy in Indonesia today is a part of decentralization 
process. Regional autonomy is aligned with the enactment of Law No. 32 of 2004 on 
Local Government and Law No. 33 of 2004 on Central and Local Fiscal Balance. Further, 
the purpose of regional autonomy is to actualize the regions to be independent and have 
the freedom to regulate their own government without central government interference. 
Until now, the implementation of regional otonomy has been implemented in each 
regencies and municipalities in Indonesia. However, the reality showed that the local 
governments can not be completely independent from the central government. This 
condition not only can be seen from the context of the political relations and regional 
authority’s framework, but also visible in the fiscal relationship between central 
government and local government (Simanjuntak, 2006). 
The direct implication of the implementation of regional autonomy is the need for 
substantial funds. The local government's main funding source comes from Local Own 
Revenue (PAD) which can be used to finance routine and development expenditures. 
Besides of local own revenue, Local governments also get support from the central 
government in the form of Balance Fund. Under Law no. 33 of 2004, Balance Fund 
consisted of General Purpose Grant (Dana Alokasi Umum - DAU), Specific Purpose 
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Grant (Dana Alokasi Khusus - DAK), and Revenue Sharing (Dana Bagi Hasil - DBH). 
The purpose of giving the balance fund is to reduce the vertical fiscal disparities (between 
central and local government), horizontal fiscal disparities (between local governments) 
and also to assist in financing local authority. 
The problems that occured nowadays is the local government too much rely on 
Balance Fund allocation to finance their routine and development expenditures without 
optimizing its potentials. Local governments are trying to keep the substantial amount of 
Balance Fund for each period. According to Adi (2007) the proportion of Balance Fund is 
still the highest compared with other local revenue, including Local Own Revenue. He 
also mentioned that the Local Own Revenue is only able to finance local government 
spending at a maximum of 20%. This condition is not in line with the objectives of 
regional autonomy which is making the local government independent with its local 
potentials. This condition has lead to an asymmetrical behavior in local government. 
According to Alderete (2004), when the central government provides assistance 
through transfers to local governments to improve their local expenditure, there is 
speculation that local government spending may respond asymmetrically to changes in 
transfer. Similarly, Maimunah (2006) proves the asymmetric behavior from the effect of 
balance fund on local government expenditure and local own revenue. The magnitudes of 
balance fund to local government expenditure much higher compare to Local Own 
Revenue. This showed that the transfer is so dominant in financing the local government 
expenditure. Indeed, this trend showed that the dependence of local governments to the 
central government is still high. In the long run this dependency should be reduced, 
because it will negatively impact on the local government independency. 
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Flypaper effect is the main discussion in this study. Flypaper effect is a condition 
which the stimulus of local spending caused by changes in central government transfers 
has a greater effect than the stimulus that caused by changes in local income (Oates, 
1999). 
Indonesia is an archipelagic country consisting of 33 provinces and 524 districts 
(DGFB, 2010). Each district has distinct regional characteristics that affect the amount of 
income or expenditure that can be obtained. These distinct circumstances is the reason 
that makes the author wants to examine the influence of the Balance Fund and the Local 
Own Revenue to the local government expenditure and whether there is a flypaper effect 
phenomenon of such influence on the local government districts in Indonesia. 
 
1.2 Objectives of Study 
The purpose of this study is to empirically prove the influence of Balance Fund 
and Local Own Revenue (PAD) on the Local Government expenditure and also to 
analyze the possibility of the flypaper effect occurence on the local government 
expenditure in Indonesia. 
 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
This study will provide some contributions of empirical research, theory and 
policy, namely (1) empirical contributions, to give empirical analysis of the influence of 
the Balance Fund and the Local Own Revenue to the allocation of local government 
expenditure in Indonesia, (2) policy contribution, to provide input for the Central and 
local Government in terms of making policy in the future, and (3) theorical contribution, 
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as material reference and additional data for other researchers whose interested in this 
study. 
 
1.4 Research Question 
To achieve the purpose of the study, this study would answer: (1) Whether 
Balance fund and local own revenue have positive significant effect on Local government 
expenditure; (2) Whether Balance fund and local own revenue can be used to predict the 
allocation of Local government expenditure; and (3) Whether or not flypaper effect 
phenomenon occurred in the intergovernmental transfer to the local government. 
 
1.5 Scope and Limitations 
This study will be performed in two parts, firstly, using cross section data of 188 
municipalities and regencies from 2006 to 2008, and secondly, using panel data of 484 
Regencies and Municipalities during 2001 to 2008. The effect of local government 
expenditure (Flypaper Effect) is only be measured by using the data of the amount of 
realization of Balance Fund and local own revenue which are collected from the local 
government budget realization (APBD) during the study period. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN INDONESIA 
 
 
Since the beginning of its independence, the Indonesian government had 
implemented intergovernmental transfer policy. Various types of subsidies and grants are 
distributed to the regions, which generally intended to cover the difference between the 
amounts of spendings and revenues. Nevertheless, the criteria of the various grants and 
subsidies are not clear and very depending on the central government's policy. This 
condition made local governments difficult in preparing the Local budget (APBD) 
because the local governments did not have certainty about the amount of subsidy that 
they would receive. 
The idea of fiscal decentralization actually had appeared in Law No. 5 of 1974 on 
“the Fundamentals of Local Government”. In contrary, what happened at that time was 
fiscal centralization system. Fiscal centralization was caused by the increase in state 
revenue from oil and gas sector in the 1970s. The central government had the ability to 
control budgets even to the Local government level. This condition happened because 
there was some reluctance from central government to give fiscal management authority 
to the local government for reasons of political stability.  
Juridical basis that regulates the implementation of regional autonomy has been 
revised two times. In the early enactment, the juridical basis was based on Law No. 22 of 
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1999 and Law No. 25 of 1999 which regulates the Regional Autonomy and Fiscal 
Decentralization. Nowadays, along with the development of regional autonomy, those 
Laws were amended by the issuance of Law No. 32 of 2004 and Law No. 33 of 2004 
which regulates “Local Government” and “Central and Local Fiscal Balance”. 
According to Law No. 33 of 2004 on “Central and Local Fiscal Balance” stated 
that, Fiscal Balance between central and local government is government financing 
system in the framework of a unitary state that includes the financial distribution between 
central and local governments. The equality among regions should follow a democratic, 
fair, transparent and proportional with regard to the potential, condition and local needs. 
Moreover, the obligations and the division of authority and authorization procedure 
should include a sound financial supervision and management. 
 
2.1 Intergovernmental Transfer 
Under the Law No. 32 of 2004, central government granting intergovernmental 
transfer for the local governments, namely Balance Fund (Dana Perimbangan), which 
consist of: General Purpose Grant (Dana Alokasi Umum - DAU), Specific Purpose Grant 
(Dana Alokasi Khusus - DAK), and Revenue Sharing (Dana Bagi Hasil - DBH). Apart 
from the Balance funds, the Local governments also have their own funding sources of 
revenue: Local Own Revenue (Pendapatan Asli Daerah - PAD), Financing and other 
legally Local Income. 
 
2.1.1 General Purpose Grant (DAU) 
DAU is a kind of intergovernmental transfer that is not tied to specific spending 
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programs. The purpose of this transfer is to close the fiscal gap and to give the ability of 
fiscal equalization between regions and also equalization between central and local 
governments. Therefore, DAU for each region will not be the same amounts. Regions 
that have low Local Own Revenue (PAD) will get higher amounts of DAU, and vice 
versa regions that have high PAD will get low amounts of DAU.  
DAU is a block grant provided to all regencies and municipalities for the purpose 
of filling the gap between capacity and fiscal need and distributed by a formula based on 
certain principles which generally indicate that poor and under developed regions should 
receive more DAU compare to rich regions. In other words the purpose of DAU is to give 
an equitable public service delivery among local governments in Indonesia. 
By definition the DAU can be interpreted as follows: 
1. As a component of the balance funds in the state budget (APBN), the allocation is 
based on the concept of the fiscal gap which is the difference between fiscal needs 
and fiscal capacity. 
2. An instrument to overcome the horizontal imbalance that is allocated for the 
purpose of equitable distribution of financial capability among the regions and its 
use is fully determined by the Local governments. 
3. This Equalization grant (DAU) serve to neutralize the imbalance of financial 
capability in the presence of differences of PAD and Revenue Sharing (DBH) 
between regions 
According to Law no. 33 of 2004, the total DAU formula is set at least 26% of 
domestic net revenue specified in the State Budget (APBN). The amounts of DAU for 
each local government are allocated on the basis of fiscal gap and basic allocation. Fiscal 
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gap is calculated based on the local fiscal needs minus with local fiscal capacity, while 
the basic allocation is computed based on the number of local civil servants. Distribution 
of DAU conducted each month and distributed 1 / 12 yearly of total DAU. 
 
2.1.2 Specific Purpose Grant (DAK) 
Specific Purpose Grant is a fund sourced from the revenue of state budget (APBN) 
allocated to specific regions in order to help funding for special regional activities and in 
accordance with national priorities. DAK is prioritized to help the regions with financial 
capacity below the national average. Additionally, DAK has been given in order to fund 
the provision of physical infrastructure facilities and basic community services which 
currently delegated as regional affairs. DAK is allocated to local districts to fund certain 
needs that are specific (special need
1
) which is depending on the availability of funds in 
the state budget.  
By definition the DAK can be interpreted as follows:  
1. Prioritized to help the areas with the financial capacity below the national average, in 
order to fund the provision of physical infrastructure facilities and basic community 
services that already given as regional affairs; 
2. To support the infrastructure development acceleration in coastal regions and small 
islands, border areas with other countries, remote areas, areas prone to flooding / 
landslides, and includes the local area tourism; 
3. To encourage productivity, employment opportunities and economic diversification, 
especially in rural areas, through specific activities in agriculture, marine and 
                                                          
1Special need is a need that is difficult to estimate with a general allocation formula (DAU), and / 
or need that is a commitment or a national priority. 
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fisheries, and infrastructure; 
4. To improve access for the poor to basic services and basic infrastructure through 
special activities in education, health, and infrastructure; 
5. To maintain and improve the quality of life, prevent environmental damage, and 
reduce disaster risk through specific activities in the environmental field, accelerate 
delivery and improve coverage and reliability of infrastructure services and basic 
facilities in one integrated system through specific activities in the field of 
infrastructure; 
6. To improve coordination and synchronization of activities funded from DAK which 
the activities funded from the budget of the Ministry / Institution.  
 
2.1.3 Revenue Sharing (DBH) 
DBH is a fund sourced from the revenue of state budget (APBN) allocated to the 
region based on percentage proportions to fund the local needs. DBH consist of two types, 
namely DBH from tax and DBH from Natural Resources. The pattern of revenue sharing 
is done with a certain percentage based on the region. DBH from tax is derived from: 1) 
Land and Building Tax (PBB), (2) Acquisition Rights to Land and Buildings tax (BPHTB) 
and (3) Income Tax. While DBH from Natural Resources is derived from: (1) Forestry, (2) 
General Mining, (3) Fisheries, (4) Oil Mining, (5) Natural Gas, and (6) Geothermal. 
Based on the Law No. 32 of 2004, as a consequence of broad autonomy authority, 
local governments have an obligation to improve services and community welfare in a 
democratic, fair, equitable, and sustainable. This obligation could be met if local 
governments are able to manage optimally their natural resource potentials, human 
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resources and financial resources. Each region is required to enhance the capabilities of 
human resources in order to explore its potential and to manage it. Therefore, local own 
revenue expected to continuosly increasing and local government dependence on central 
government transfer expected to be reduced.  
 
2.2 Local Own Revenue (Pendapatan Asli Daerah - PAD) 
Nowadays, with the implementation of regional autonomy, the local governments 
have its own authority to fully regulate its administrative functions. With such authority, 
the local governments are also required to make regional policy to create and enhance 
people's welfare. In order to achieve this, the local own revenue is expected to be able to 
support local needs (local government expenditure) and also expected to be increasing 
each year. Related to this, Local governments are also has greater freedom in exploring 
the potential of local source revenues as a form of decentralization principles.  
PAD is revenue earned from Local government which consists of local taxes, 
Retribution, Income from Separation of local property product and other legally local 
revenue (Article 157 of Law No. 32 of 2004 and Article 6 of Law no. 33 of 2004). PAD 
is one source of revenue that should always keep in spur growth. In the autonomy era, the 
local government is demanded to be more dependent in financing local development and 
improving service to the community. Therefore, investment growth in the regencies and 
municipalities should be prioritized because it expected to give a positive impact on 
improving the national economy. 
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2.3 Local Government Expenditure (Belanja Daerah) 
Local income earned from both PAD and the intergovernmental transfer would be 
used by local governments to finance their Local Expenditures which consist of: Routine 
Expenditures and Development expenditure. Routine Expenditures is a form of non 
physical expenditure which occurs continuously throughout the budget period. For 
example: civil servants salaries, honorarium, goods expenditures, and other expenditures. 
Routine expenditure is generally used to finance local government operations and the 
impact can not be enjoyed directly by the public. 
Apart from Routine Expenditures, local governments also make non-routine 
expenditure and generally in a physical form which benefits for more than one year. 
Development expenditure incurred by local government which benefits can be felt 
directly by the people because it is intended to improve public services. For example: 
expenditure for roads construction, school buildings, hospitals, bridges construction and 
so forth. All of those expenditures can be felt directly by the public. 
 
2.4 The objective of Intergovernmental Transfer 
At least there are five main purposes of intergovernmental transfers. First of all, 
Vertical Equalization, Central Government controls most of the sources of the main state 
revenue (taxes). Meanwhile, local government controls only a small portion of state 
revenue sources, or only has the authority to levy local taxes. This condition causes the 
vertical imbalance between Central and Local Government. As a result, regions with 
abundant natural resources can not fully gain the wealth of their region. This condition 
can be resolved by using Balanced Fund, especially Revenue Sharing (DBH). With 
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Balanced Fund, the regions that produced revenue sources (taxes and natural resources) 
would receive a larger portion of revenue sharing. 
Secondly, Horizontal Equalization, the Local Government ability to generate 
income are varies greatly depending on the condition of the regions itself. This implies to 
the fiscal capacity in the regions. In addition, each area also has varies local government 
expenditures depending on the total population, the proportion of the population, and the 
geography condition. This implies to the variation of fiscal needs in the regions. The 
difference between fiscal needs and fiscal capacity is called fiscal gap. This fiscal gap 
will be offset by transfers from the central government in the form of DAU. 
Thirdly, maintain the achievement of minimum service standards in each region. 
Each region has a varying ability to provide public services for its citizens; this is mainly 
due to differences of resources possessed by each region. Meanwhile, the minimum 
public service standard for each local government in Indonesia must be maintained 
equally. Therefore the central government must ensure standards of public services in 
each region by providing subsidies. 
Fourth, overcome problems arising from the various or abundance effects of 
public service. Each type of public services will not be enjoyed only by people in that 
certain area, but also can be enjoyed by people from other area. For example, good 
education, inter-regional highway, and proper local hospitals, can not be restricted only to 
public benefit for certain areas. Nevertheless, without any benefit (in the form of income), 
local government is usually reluctant to invest in it. Therefore, the central government 
needs to provide some incentives or give financial resources to the local government to 
fulfill such public services. 
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Finally, stabilization, this can be done by using transfer as a stabilizer at the time 
of sluggish regional economic activity or at the time of increases economic activity. At 
the moment of regional economic activity is slowing down, granting the transfer can be 
increased, and vice versa when the economy is increasing, granting the transfer can be 
reduced. However, accuracy is needed to calculate the decrease and increase in the 
transfer and determine the right moment to conduct the policy in order not to cause 
conflict with the purpose of stabilization. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FLYPAPER EFFECT 
 
 
Oates (1999) stated that several studies have been done to know the behavior of 
local governments in responding the central government transfers. He concluded that 
there was a different response of local governments expenditure towards central 
government transfers compare to their local own revenue. In brief, the response of local 
government to central government transfer is greater than their local own revenue so-
called flypaper effect.  
Some empirical studies had showed the occurrence of differences stimulus 
between grants and Local own revenue. The phenomenon of flypaper effect had brought 
broader implications that the transfer would increase the local government spending 
(Turnbull, 1998). While, according to Hines & Thaler (1995) flypaper-effect is seen as an 
anomaly in a rational behavior. If the transfer should be considered as an (additional) 
income for the people (as well as local taxes), then it should be spent in the same way too.  
Similarly, Aaberge & Langorgen (1997) analyzed the fiscal and local government 
spending behavior by using simultaneous setting and they found a flypaper-effect in the 
local response to the changes in transfer revenue. The problem for the Norwegian local 
government in making resource allocation decisions are: the selection of the best 
combination of local taxes, budget surpluses and deficits, and output in the public service, 
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which is limited by the "rules" that the total local government spending plus the budget 
surplus can not exceed the total of central government grants plus local taxes.  
Flypaper effect phenomenon can occur in two versions (Gorodnichenko, 2001). 
Firstly, lead to the increase in local taxes and excessive of government budget spending. 
Secondly, lead to a higher elasticity of local government expenditure to transfer rather 
than the elasticity of local government expenditure to local tax revenue. Those above 
studies, support the hypothesis of flypaper-effect. 
 
3.1 Theories of flypaper effect 
Those above anomalies conditions triggered intensive discussion among 
economists. Their debates offered some explanations. In the economic realm, there are 
two theories that can explain the flypaper effect phenomenon (Sagbas and Saruc, 2004), 
namely the bureaucratic model and the fiscal illusion model. The bureaucratic model 
examines flypaper effect from the viewpoint of bureaucrats, while the fiscal illusion 
model examines from the viewpoint of society who have limited information on their 
local authority budgets. 
 
3.1.1 The bureaucratic model 
The bureaucratic school of thought initiated by Niskanen (1968). In his view, 
bureaucrats have a powerful position in the public decision making. He assumed that the 
bureaucrats behave to maximizing budget as proxy of their power. Implicitly, this 
bureaucratic model confirmed the flypaper effects as a result of the behavior of 
bureaucrats who spend transfer (grants) more freely rather than raise taxes. Likewise, 
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McGuire (1973) argued this as the behavior of the local decision-maker in maximizing 
their utility (the greedy politicians’ model). Thus, the flypaper effect occurs because the 
superiority knowledge of the bureaucrats about transfer. In brief, more information 
owned by the bureaucrats allow them to make an excessive spending 
The important implication of this bureaucratic model is that fiscal decentralization 
can help in explaining the growth of the public sector. In a decentralized system, local 
governments have more information to distinguish the interests of the people so they can 
obtain more resources from the economy (Tiebout, 1956). This gives the implication that 
the economic efficiency provision of public goods can be achieved by involving the 
community participation. 
 
3.1.2 The fiscal illusion model 
Oates (1979) on Erik borge (1995) states flypaper effect phenomenon can be 
explained by fiscal illusion. He stated that the flypaper effect is the result of ignorance of 
the people to the local government budget. Grossman (1990) described that fiscal illusion 
happened because of the separation of taxing and spending power that obscured the tax 
payers (people) perceptions. Apparently, fiscal illusion is defined as either public 
misperception about the financing or budget allocations which the decisions on both 
cases resulting from this kind of misperception. Logan (1986) argues that the 
misperceptions can continue in the long run.  
Turnbull (1992) offers another explanation about these misperceptions. According 
to Turnbull, the uncertainty of public goods price level would create a risk. This risk in 
the long run will lead to an excessive spending. Likewise, Fillimon, Romer, and 
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Rosenthal (1982) developed a hypothesis of fiscal illusion in the context of the public 
ignorance about the number of transfers of their local government received. In this case, 
the local governments trying to hide the number of transfers received and then spend it at 
the maximum level. As a result, people see that there has been an increase of local 
government spending with a higher increase than the increase in quantity demanded as a 
reflection of the increase in revenue. 
 
3.2 Flypaper effect phenomenon in other countries 
The studies of flypaper effect have been done in several countries. As an 
illustration, Legrenzi & Milas (2001) showed an empirical evidence of the existence of 
flypaper-effect in the long run for the sample municipalities in Italy. They stated that the 
local Governments consistently increase their expenditure more with respect to increase 
in state transfer rather than to increase in own revenues. 
Similarly, Deller et al (2002) analyze the relationship between income derived 
from the state shared revenue using a cross section data for 581 Wisconsin cities and 
villages in the United States and found that for every dollar increase in income per capita, 
the total expenditure per capita increased by about 12-15 cents. While for every dollar 
increase in per capita revenue sharing, the expenditure per capita increased by 46-55 
cents. These results are consistent with the hypothesis of flypaper-effect. They also found 
a decrease in local property taxes revenues per capita amounted to 32-41 per cents as a 
result of an increase of one dollar in revenue sharing. As a result the revenue sharing is 
stimulated spending greater than expected (flypaper effect), revenue sharing lowered the 
local pressure for gaining a higher income from property taxes. They suspected that the 
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local response pattern is also affected by the determination formula of profit-sharing itself. 
Indeed, Slack (1980) also conducted an empirical analysis study with a sample of 
municipalities in Canada and he stated that unconditional grants to municipalities is 
followed with the increase in municipalities spending (but with a smaller number than the 
grants). However, the spending response to the conditional grants was not too obvious. 
Also, Zampeli (1986) provide a similar evidence for data in the municipal governments in 
the United States, flypaper-effect occured in reaction to the unconditional grants 
expenditure. Above all, those studies support the hypothesis of Flypaper effect. 
 
3.3 The flypaper effect as one of the indicators for the success of decentralization 
3.3.1 The effect of Intergovernmental transfer to local expenditure 
Since the implementation of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia, the central 
government expects the region to manage its resources so as not to rely solely on the 
Intergovernmental Transfer (Balanced Fund). In some regions the role of the Balanced 
Fund is significant because the local spending policy is dominated by the amount of 
Balanced Fund they received rather than the PAD (Sidik, 2002). The relationship 
between revenues (taxes) and expenditures had been widely discussed and the various 
hypotheses about the relationship had been empirically tested (Chang & Ho, 2002).  
Furthermore, some studies claimed that revenue affects expenditure, while some 
others claimed the expenditure that affects revenue (Doi, 1998). Whilst the study of the 
effect of transfers or central government grants toward spending decisions or local 
government spending is already discussed for more than 30 years (Gamkhar & Oates, 
1996). Theoretically, the response of distributive and allocative effects should have no 
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different impact from other funding sources, such as local tax revenues (Bradford & 
Oates, 1971). However, in empirical studies this condition is not always happened. This 
means, the stimulus from the transfer or grant to the local spending is often greater than 
the stimulus of local revenue (local taxes) itself (flypaper effect). 
Additionally, Holtz-Eakin et al (1994) stated that there is a closed relation 
between the central government transfers to the local government spending. Also, 
Gamkhar & Oates (1996) analyzed the local government response to changes in the 
number of transfers from the federal government in the United States from 1953 to 1991. 
They stated that the reduction in the amount of transfers caused a decrease in local 
spending.   
Legrenzi & Milas (2001) found empirical evidence that in the long run, the 
transfer affects the local government expenditure and the declining of the number of 
transfers may cause a decrease in local government expenditure. Furthermore, Priyo Hari 
Adi (2008) strengthens this trend. He found that the Indonesian local government is not 
getting more independently; on the contrary the local government dependence on central 
government transfers becomes higher. This gives strong indications that the behavior of 
local government spending is greatly influenced by the transfer revenue source.  
Certainly, the above research results have shown that the intergovernmental 
transfer is an important source of income for a region to fulfiil it’s spending. The total 
amount of intergovernmental transfer can show the level of independence of a region. In 
brief, the more intergovernmental transfer received it means the region is still highly 
depending on the central government in fulfilling its spending, which indicates that the 
region had not been independent, and vice versa. 
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In a budgeting process, there is an incrementalism theory. Incrementalism 
budgeting theory is a budgeting system which simply increases or decrease the amount of 
budget on pre-existing items using previous year budget data as a basis to adjust the size 
of the addition or subtraction for the current year budget. 
Based on the concept above, my study hypothesis can be expressed as follows: 
H1a: Balanced Fundcurrentyear (Transt) has a positive significant effect on Local 
Government Expenditure Current Year (Locexpt) 
H1b: Balanced Fundprevious year
2
 (Transt-1) has a positive significant effect on 
Local Government Expenditure Current Year (Locexpt) 
 
3.3.2 The effect of Local Own Revenue to local expenditure 
Studies about the influence of local own revenue to local spending has been done 
(eg Von Furstenberg et al, 1986; Legrenzi & Milas, 2001). The hypothesis which states 
that local revenue (mainly tax) will affect local government spending is known as tax 
spend hypothesis (Doi, 1998; Von Furstenberg et al 1986). In this case local government 
spending will be adjusted depends on local government revenue (income changes 
occurred before changes in expenditure). 
In the international context, several studies have been done to see the impact of 
local income to expenditure. Cheng (1999) found that the tax-spend hypothesis applies to 
the case of local government in several Latin American countries, namely Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Paraguay. Likewise, Hoover & Sheffrin (1992), they 
are empirically found that there is a difference relationship in the two different time 
frames. They found that for the sample data before the mid-1960s the tax effect on 
                                                          
2Transt-1: using lag 1 year data of Balanced Fund 
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spending, while for the sample data after the 1960s taxes and spending do not affect each 
other (causally independent). 
The above research results have shown that the Local Own revenue (PAD) is an 
important source of income for a region to fulfil its spending. The total amount of PAD 
can show the level of independence of a region. The more local revenue gained may 
allow the region to fulfill its local expenditure without depending on central government 
transfer, which shows that local governments have been able to be more independent, and 
vice versa. 
Based on this concept, my study hypothesis can be expressed as follows: 
H2a: Local Own Revenue (PAD) current year (Ownrevt) has a positive significant 
effect on Local Government Expenditure current year (Locexpt) 
H2b: Local Own Revenue (PAD) previous year
3
 (Ownrevt-1) has a positive 
significant effect on Local Government Expenditure current year (Locexpt) 
 
3.3.3 The flypaper effect as a phenomenon in predicting the local government 
expenditure 
Legrenzi & Milas (2001) assert that the government policy variables in the short 
run are adjusted with the transfer they received. Holzt-Eakin et al (1994) analyzed the 
maximization model under uncertainty of intertemporal utility function using annual time 
series data from 1934 to 1991. They found that, the extent of local spending can be 
rationalized through a model in which decisions are based on the availability of 
permanent resources, not the temporary resources. They found that grants last year can 
predict expenditures of the current year, but on the contrary, spending last year can not 
                                                          
3Ownrevt-1: using lag 1 year data of Local Own Revenue (PAD) 
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predict earnings for the current year. 
Flypaper effect is the major phenomenon in this study. Pramela (2009) stated that 
the flypaper effect is a condition that occurs when governments spending respond (more 
improvident) in using transfers (grants) than using its own capabilities (PAD). She 
conducted the research using 13 municipalities / regencies in Sumatra Island and found 
flypaper effect in response to DAU and PAD. She also observed the occurrence of 
flypaper effect in predicting the future local government expenditure. Furthermore, Sukri 
and Halim (2004) on Pramela (2009) found the same result of flypaper effect for the 
research in Java and Bali Islands. They empirically prove that the magnitude of local 
spending is influenced by the amount of DAU received from the central government 
(DAU predictive power to the local government spending is higher than the predictive 
power of PAD). 
In brief, from those above several studies, they have given the fact that Indonesian 
local government is still dependent on central government. This is proven by the 
occurrence of flypaper effect in the regions object of their research. Undoubtedly, this 
means that the regions are not yet independent. 
Based on this concept, my study hypothesis can be expressed as follows: 
H3a: Balanced Fund currentyear (Transt) has a greater effect on Local 
Government Expenditure current year (Locexpt) rather than Local Own 
Revenue (PAD) current year (Ownrevt)  
H3b: Balanced Fund previous year (Transt-1) has a greater effect on Local 
Government Expenditure current year (Locexpt) rather than Local Own 
Revenue (PAD) previous year (Ownrevt-1) 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE FINDINGS AND RESULTS 
 
 
This study using Regencies / Municipalities data in Indonesia during period from 
2001 until 2008 with total of 484 Regencies / Municipalities (source: BPS – Indonesia 
Central Bureau of Statistics). Due to the changes in the number of regions in Indonesia 
during the period of study – the regions experienced unification, division and 
establishment during 2006 until 2008 – then the sample will be used in this study are the 
regions that meet the following criteria: 
1. The availability of Local Budget Realization Report data (APBD)4 from 2006 until 
2008. 
2. Regencies / Municipalities that already exist and not experiencing changes (division, 
unification)
5
 during 2006 to 2008 
                                                          
4The availability of APBD data (Local Budget Realization Report data) depends on whether 
regencies / municipalities are already formed or not during the study period. 
5For example, during the year 2001, the total number of regencies / municipalities in Indonesia 
are 337 regencies / municipalities, while in 2008 the total number of regencies / municipalities 
are increased to 484 regencies / municipalities. The total number of regencies / municipalities 
are increased by about 147 regencies / municipalities during 8 years. Some regencies / 
municipalities that is found not having APBD data during the study period is caused by the 
current regencies/municipalities has not been established/formed yet.  
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Referring to those above criterias, there were only 188 Regencies / Municipalities 
that can be used as a sample in this study. This study is using secondary data ie Local 
Own Revenue (PAD), Balance Fund (Dana Perimbangan) and Local Expenditure which 
are included in the Local Budget Realization Report data (APBD). This data was 
obtained from Directorate General of Fiscal Balance website 
(http://www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/). 
This study is using regression analysis that are simple regression and multiple 
regression analysis. Simple regression analysis is used to observe the effect of Balance 
Fund (Trans) and local own revenue (Ownrev) to total local expenditure (Locexp) in 
cross section with the following equation: 
              
 
Where: 
   : Total Local Expenditures (Locexpt)  
   : Constant 
   : Regression Coefficient 
   : Total Transt (Transt-1) or Total Ownrevt (Ownrevt-1) 
  : Error term 
Multiple regression analysis is used to predict whether the variables of Balance 
Fund (Trans) and Local own revenue (Ownrev) are simultaneously affecting the local 
expenditure (Locexp). The regression equation used is as follows: 
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Where: 
   : Total expenditures (Locexpt) 
   : Constant 
      : Regression Coefficient 
    : Total Transt (Transt-1) 
    : Total Ownrevt (Ownrevt-1) 
  : Error term 
 
In addition to those above cross-section data analysis, using a model by Sacbas 
and Saruc (2004), a panel data analysis was carried out to examine the flypaper effect. In 
panel data analysis, 484 regencies/municipalities data are used over the period of 2001 
until 2008. 
The aim of using those above data analysis is to prove the hypothesis 
(H1a ,H1b ,H2a ,H2b ,H3a ,H3b) of the effect of Balance Fund (Trans) and Local own 
revenue (Ownrev) to local expenditure (Locexp).  
 
4.1 Analysis the effect of Transt and Ownrevt to Locexpt 
Simple regression model is used to know the effect of Balance Fund current year 
(Transt) and Local Own revenue current year (Ownrevt) to the Local Expenditure 
current year (Locexpt). To simplify the regression calculation, this study was completed 
by using STATA 10.0.  
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Table 1:  
Analysis the effect of Balance Fund current year (Transt) to the Local Expenditure 
current year (Locexpt) 
 
Variable 
Local Expenditure current year (Locexpt) 
Year 2008 Year 2007 Year 2006 
Constant 
12985.94 
(1.00) 
92762.3 
(4.56) 
38196.35 
(3.02) 
Transfer Current Year (Transt) 
(Balanced Fund) 
1.130835 
(52.28) 
1.463722 
(35.31) 
0.8767144 
(33.76) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9360 0.8695 0.8589 
Included observations 188 188 188 
Notes: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. 
 
Table 2:  
Analysis the effect of Local Own revenue current year (Ownrevt) to the Local 
Expenditure current year (Locexpt) 
 
Variable 
Local Expenditure current year (Locexpt) 
Year 2008 Year 2007 Year 2006 
Constant 
510765.8 
(28.17) 
454341.3 
(21.53) 
337776.5 
(25.04) 
Own Revenue Current Year 
(Ownrevt) 
1.896648 
(11.33) 
3.190334 
(10.17) 
2.456278 
(11.51) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4052 0.3537 0.4130 
Included observations 188 188 188 
Notes: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. 
Due to the simple regression results from table 1 and table 2 (using year 2008 
results)
6
, it can be interpreted that: with 1% significant level, 1% increasing in Balanced 
Fund 2008 (Transt) will followed by 1.1308% increased in Local expenditure 2008 
(Locexpt). Additionally, 1% increased in Own Revenue 2008 (Ownrevt) will followed 
by 1.8966% increased in Local Expenditure 2008 (Locexpt), holding other factors 
constant. 
                                                          
6The year of 2008 is used as the year that can represent the year of 2006 and the year of 2007. 
The output interpretation in the year 2008 can also be found similar for year 2006 and year 
2007. 
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From the Significance test results, Balanced Fund 2008 (Transt) obtained t-
statistic of 52.28, then hypothesis H1a is accepted, which means Balanced Fund 2008 
(Transt) has a positive and significant impact on Local expenditure 2008 (Locexpt). 
This means the higher the current year's Balance Fund (Transt) the greater the local 
expenditure current year (Locexpt). Additionally, Own Revenue 2008 (Ownrevt) 
obtained t-statistic of 11.33, then hypothesis H2a is accepted, which means Own 
Revenue 2008 (Ownrevt) has a positive and significant impact on Local expenditure 
2008 (Locexpt). This means the higher the current year's local own revenue (Ownrevt) 
the greater the local expenditure current year (Locexpt). 
While the multiple regression analysis is used to determine the effect of Transfer 
Current Year (Transt) and Own Revenue Current Year (Ownrevt) against Local 
Expenditure Current year (Locexpt), the results can be shown in the table below: 
Table 3:  
Analysis the effect of Transfer Current Year (Transt) and Own Revenue Current 
Year (Ownrevt) against Local Expenditure Current year (Locexpt) 
 
Variable 
Local Expenditure current year (Locexpt) 
Year 2008 Year 2007 Year 2006 
Constant 
21493.02 
(2.24) 
63560.96 
(3.65) 
54819.12 
(5.64) 
Transfer Current Year (Transt) 
(Balanced Fund) 
0.6108201 
(13.54) 
1.175207 
(8.83) 
0.7563436 
(34.01) 
Own Revenue Current Year 
(Ownrevt) 
1.010308 
(56.89) 
1.307209 
(33.43) 
1.04968 
(11.72) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9677 0.9077 0.9186 
Included observations 188 188 188 
Notes: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. 
Table 3 (using year 2008 results) shown that the Adjusted R-Squared of 0.9677 
means that 96.77%, both variables (Balanced Fund 2008 and Own Revenue 2008) can 
explain the model and the remaining of 3,33% is explained by other variables outside of 
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this model. This indicates that both Balanced Fund current year (Transt) and Own 
Revenue current year (Ownrevt) influence significantly against Local expenditure 
current year (Locexpt). 
As for observing the Flypaper Effect Phenomenon, this study compared the 
value of each coeficient when all of the variables (Balanced Fund and Own Revenue) are 
regressed simultaneously. Coefficient for Own Revenue 2008 (1.010308) is greater than 
coefficient for Balanced Fund 2008 (0.6108201). Thus, the magnitude of Own Revenue 
current year (Ownrevt) is significantly more powerful against Local Expenditure current 
year (Locexpt) than Balanced Fund current year (Transt). This study concluded that the 
hypothesis H3a that states “Balanced Fund current year (Transt) has a greater effect 
on Local Government Expenditure current year (Locexpt) rather than Local Own 
Revenue (PAD) current year (Ownrevt)” is rejected. 
 
4.2 Analysis the effect of Transt-1 and Ownrevt-1 to Locexpt 
Simple regression model is used to know the predictive power of each 
independent variable - the effect of Balance Fund previous year (Transt-1) and Local 
Own revenue previous year (Ownrevt-1) -to Local Expenditure current year (Locexpt). 
Table 4:  
Analysis the the effect of Balance Fund previous year (Transt-1) to Local 
Expenditure current year (Locexpt) 
 
Variable 
Local Expenditure current year (Locexpt) 
Year 2008 Year 2007 
Constant 
17920.98 
(0.83) 
6581.99 
(0.32) 
Transfer Previous Year (Transt-1) 
(Balanced Fund) 
1.314342 
(29.92) 
1.30794 
(30.51) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8271 0.8325 
Included observations 188 188 
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Table 5:  
Analysis the the effect of Local Own revenue previous year (Ownrevt-1)  to Local 
Expenditure current year (Locexpt) 
 
Variable 
Local Expenditure current year (Locexpt) 
Year 2008 Year 2007 
Constant 
491979.1 
(27.79) 
456646.2 
(20.50) 
Own revenue previous year 
(Ownrevt-1) 
3.354684 
(12.74) 
3.190769 
(9.05) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4631 0.3021 
Included observations 188 188 
Notes: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. 
Due to the simple regression results from table 4 and table 5 (Using year 2008 
results), it can be interpreted that: with 1% significant level, 1% increasing in Balanced 
Fund 2007 (Transt-1) will followed by 1.3143% increased in Local Expenditure 2008 
(Locexpt). Additionally, 1% increased in Own Revenue 2007 (Ownrevt-1) will followed 
by 3.3547% increased in Local Expenditure 2008 (Locexpt), holding other factors 
constant. 
From the Significance test results, Balanced Fund 2007 (Transt-1) obtained t-
statistic of 29.92, then hypothesis H1b is accepted, which means Transfer 2007(Transt-1) 
has a positive and significant impact on Local Expenditure 2008 (Locexpt). This means 
the higher the previous year's Balance Fund (Transt-1) the greater the local expenditure 
current year (Locexpt). Additionally, Own Revenue 2007 (Ownrevt-1) obtained t-
statistic of 12.74, then hypothesis H2b is accepted, which means Own Revenue 2007 
(Ownrevt-1) has a positive and significant impact on Local Expenditure 2008 (Locexpt). 
This means the higher the previous year's local own revenue (Ownrevt-1) the greater the 
local expenditure current year (Locexpt). 
While the multiple regression analysis is used to determine the effect Transt-1 and 
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Ownrevt-1 against Locexpt, the results can be shown in the table below: 
Table 6:  
Analysis the effect of Balance Fund previous year (Transt-1)and Local Own revenue 
previous year (Ownrevt-1) against Local Expenditure current year (Locexpt) 
 
Variable 
Local Expenditure current year (Locexpt) 
Year 2008 Year 2007 
Constant 
59461.14 
(3.96) 
8682.6 
(0.44) 
Transfer Previous Year (Transt-1) 
(Balanced Fund) 
1.091695 
(32.39) 
0.963915 
(5.30) 
Own revenue previous year 
(Ownrevt-1) 
1.671782 
(14.58) 
1.197404 
(26.52) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9191 0.8538 
Included observations 188 188 
Notes: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. 
Table 6 (using year 2008 results) shown that the Adjusted R-Squared of 0.9191 
means that 91.91%, both variables  Balanced Fund 2007 and Own Revenue 2007 
(Transt-1 and Ownrevt-1) can explain the model and the remaining of 8,09% is explained 
by other variables outside of this model. This indicates that both Balanced Fund previous 
year (Transt-1) and Own Revenue previous year (Ownrevt-1) influence significantly 
against Local Expenditure current year (Locexpt). 
As for predicting the Flypaper Effect Phenomenon, this study compared the 
value of each coeficient when all of the variables (Balanced Fund and Own Revenue) are 
regressed simultaneously. Coeficient for Local Own Revenue previous year (2007) 
(1.6718) is greater than coefficient for Balance Fund previous year (2007) (1.0917). 
Thus the magnitude of Local Own Revenue previous year (Ownrevt-1) is significantly 
more powerful in predicting Local Expenditure comparing to the magnitude of Balance 
Fund previous year (Transt-1). This study concluded that the hypothesis H3b that states 
“Balanced Fund previous year (Transt-1) has a greater effect on Local Government 
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Expenditure current year (Locexpt) rather than Local Own Revenue (PAD) 
previous year (Ownrevt-1)” is rejected. 
 
4.3 Panel Data Analysis (Sacbas and Saruc 2004) 
Table 7:  
Panel Data Analysis to see the effect of Balance Fund and Own Revenue to Local 
Government Expenditure 
 
Variable Local Expenditure 
Constant 365.8427 
Transfer  
(Balanced Fund) 
0.8682307 
(8.51) 
Own Revenue 
(PAD) 
3.980366 
(3.21) 
R-squared 0.9462 
Included observations 2338 
Notes: Figures in brackets are z-value 
As for observing the most dominant variable affects Local Expenditure (Locexp), 
this study compared the value of each coeficient when all of the variables (Balanced Fund 
and Own Revenue) are regressed simultaneously with panel data. Coeficient for Own 
Revenue (3.9804) is greater than coefficient for Balanced Fund (0.8682). Thus the 
magnitude of Own Revenue is significantly more powerful against Local Expenditure 
comparing to the magnitude of Balance Fund (No evidence of Flypaper Effect 
Phenomenon).  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Based on the findings and results of data analysis above we can conclude: 
1. Local Own revenue current year (Ownrevt) has a positive and significant impact on 
Local Expenditure current year (Locexpt). This means the higher the revenue derived 
from local taxes, Retribution, Income from Separation of local property product and 
other legally local revenue, the greater the local expenditure of regencies / 
municipalities. Similarly, Local Own revenue previous year (Ownrevt-1) also has a 
positive and significant impact on Local Expenditure current year (Locexpt). This 
means, the greater Local Own revenue previous year, the greater the Local 
Expenditure current year. 
2. Balance Fund current year (Transt) has a positive and significant impact on Local 
Expenditure current year (Locexpt). This means the higher Balance Fund current 
year received from the central government, the greater the Local Expenditure current 
year (Locexpt). Likewise, Balance Fund previous year (Transt-1) also has a positive 
and significant impact on Local Expenditure current year (Locexpt). This means, the 
greater Balance Fund previous year, the greater the Local Expenditure current year. 
3. While to prove whether the flypaper effect occurs or not, we compare the magnitude 
of Balance Fund and Local Own revenue to the Local Expenditure. Certainly, the 
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magnitude of Local Own revenue current year (Ownrevt) against Local Expenditure 
current year (Locexpt) is higher than the magnitude of Balance Fund current year 
(Transt), so it can be conclude that the effect of Local Own revenue current year on 
Local Expenditure current year is stronger than the effect of Balance Fund current 
year. Or in other words, the behavior of local governments in setting spending 
policies is not triggered by the amount of Balance Fund received in the current year. 
This proves the non occurence of flypaper effect in the local government response to 
the central government transfer fund. 
4. In the same way, the predictive power of Local Own revenue previous year 
(Ownrevt-1) had a greater effect on the Local Expenditure current year (Locexpt) 
than the predictive power Balance Fund previous year (Transt-1). Thus, the behavior 
of Local governments in establishing Local Expenditure is more determined by the 
amount of Local Own revenue had been received in the earlier period rather than the 
total amount of Balance Fund previous year.  
5. Furthermore, by using panel data, it proved that the magnitude of Local Own 
revenue is greater than the magnitude of Balance Fund. Undoubtedly, all of the 
above empirical result showed the non occurrence of flypaper effect. This means 
local government spending policies are not dominated by the amount of Balance 
Fund, but it is dominated by the amount of Local Own revenue. 
This study has several limitations that require development and improvement for 
further study. The limitations of this study are: 
1. This study uses secondary data obtained from local government budget realization 
(APBD), published by the Directorate General of Fiscal Balance website, which is 
 
 
34 
 
not involved the behavioral aspects of local government in allocating resources, 
setting spending policies, effectiveness of absorption of Local Own Revenue (PAD) 
and efficiency in the use of revenues (both Local Own Revenue and Balanced Fund) 
to Local Government Expenditures. 
2. This study does not examine the effectiveness and efficiency of the budget. For 
example, this study does not consider the quantity, structure, age and educational 
level of employees and local residents, so it can not provide conclusions about the 
moderating factors and contingencies. 
3. This study only uses two independent variables that affect the Local government 
expenditure i.e Local Own Revenue (PAD) and Balanced Fund so that the results of 
this study is still simple 
From some of the limitations mentioned above, the author gives some following 
recommendations i.e 
1. For further studies, it is better to include aspects of local government behavior in the 
allocation of resources, and observe the effectiveness and efficiency in the use of the 
budget. 
2. In addition to that, it is recommended to use more independent variables in the 
regression model. 
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Appendix 1: The effect of Trans2008 and Ownrev2008 to Locexp2008 
 
 
 
  
                                                                              
       _cons     21493.02   9583.208     2.24   0.026                        .
    ownrev08     1.010308   .0177587    56.89   0.000                 .8644904
     trans08     .6108201   .0451013    13.54   0.000                 .2057986
                                                                              
    locexp08        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    1.4916e+13   187  7.9762e+10           Root MSE      =   50786
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9677
    Residual    4.7715e+11   185  2.5792e+09           R-squared     =  0.9680
       Model    1.4438e+13     2  7.2192e+12           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   185) = 2799.04
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     188
. reg locexp08 trans08 ownrev08, beta
       _cons    -12985.94   13002.72    -1.00   0.319                        .
     trans08     1.130835   .0216287    52.28   0.000                 .9676225
                                                                              
    locexp08        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    1.4916e+13   187  7.9762e+10           Root MSE      =   71475
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9360
    Residual    9.5022e+11   186  5.1087e+09           R-squared     =  0.9363
       Model    1.3965e+13     1  1.3965e+13           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   186) = 2733.63
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      188
. reg locexp08 trans08 , beta
       _cons     510765.8   18132.99    28.17   0.000                        .
    ownrev08     1.896648   .1673969    11.33   0.000                 .6390218
                                                                              
    locexp08        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    1.4916e+13   187  7.9762e+10           Root MSE      =  2.2e+05
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4052
    Residual    8.8248e+12   186  4.7445e+10           R-squared     =  0.4083
       Model    6.0907e+12     1  6.0907e+12           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   186) =  128.37
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      188
. reg locexp08 ownrev08, beta
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Appendix 2: The effect of Trans2007 and Ownrev2007 to Locexp2008 
 
 
 
  
       _cons     59461.14   15016.46     3.96   0.000                        .
    ownrev07     1.671782   .1146585    14.58   0.000                 .3401928
     trans07     1.091695   .0337013    32.39   0.000                 .7557993
                                                                              
    locexp08        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    1.4916e+13   187  7.9762e+10           Root MSE      =   80329
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9191
    Residual    1.1938e+12   185  6.4527e+09           R-squared     =  0.9200
       Model    1.3722e+13     2  6.8609e+12           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   185) = 1063.25
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      188
. reg locexp08 trans07 ownrev07,beta
       _cons     17920.98   21556.05     0.83   0.407                        .
     trans07     1.314342   .0439248    29.92   0.000                  .909942
                                                                              
    locexp08        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    1.4916e+13   187  7.9762e+10           Root MSE      =  1.2e+05
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8271
    Residual    2.5656e+12   186  1.3793e+10           R-squared     =  0.8280
       Model    1.2350e+13     1  1.2350e+13           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   186) =  895.36
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      188
. reg locexp08 trans07 ,beta
                                                                              
       _cons     491979.1   17701.11    27.79   0.000                        .
    ownrev07     3.354684   .2633087    12.74   0.000                 .6826484
                                                                              
    locexp08        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    1.4916e+13   187  7.9762e+10           Root MSE      =  2.1e+05
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4631
    Residual    7.9648e+12   186  4.2821e+10           R-squared     =  0.4660
       Model    6.9508e+12     1  6.9508e+12           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   186) =  162.32
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      188
. reg locexp08 ownrev07,beta
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Appendix 3: The effect of Trans2007 and Ownrev2007 to Locexp2007 
 
 
 
  
                                                                              
       _cons    -63560.96   17421.04    -3.65   0.000                        .
    ownrev07     1.307209   .0390979    33.43   0.000                 .8330996
     trans07     1.175207   .1330188     8.83   0.000                 .2201438
                                                                              
    locexp07        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    1.7601e+13   187  9.4125e+10           Root MSE      =   93192
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9077
    Residual    1.6067e+12   185  8.6848e+09           R-squared     =  0.9087
       Model    1.5995e+13     2  7.9973e+12           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   185) =  920.85
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     188
. reg locexp07 trans07 ownrev07, beta
                                                                              
       _cons     -92762.3   20341.39    -4.56   0.000                        .
     trans07     1.463722   .0414497    35.31   0.000                 .9328476
                                                                              
    locexp07        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    1.7601e+13   187  9.4125e+10           Root MSE      =  1.1e+05
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8695
    Residual    2.2846e+12   186  1.2283e+10           R-squared     =  0.8702
       Model    1.5317e+13     1  1.5317e+13           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   186) = 1247.03
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      188
. reg locexp07 trans07 , beta
                                                                              
       _cons     454341.3   21097.93    21.53   0.000                        .
    ownrev07     3.190334   .3138372    10.17   0.000                 .5976245
                                                                              
    locexp07        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    1.7601e+13   187  9.4125e+10           Root MSE      =  2.5e+05
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3537
    Residual    1.1315e+13   186  6.0833e+10           R-squared     =  0.3572
       Model    6.2864e+12     1  6.2864e+12           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   186) =  103.34
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      188
. reg locexp07 ownrev07, beta
 
 
39 
 
 
Appendix 4: The effect of Trans2006 and Ownrev2006 to Locexp2007 
 
 
 
  
                                                                              
       _cons       8682.6   19732.48     0.44   0.660                        .
    ownrev06     1.197404   .0451572    26.52   0.000                 .8357786
     trans06      .963915   .1818531     5.30   0.000                  .167069
                                                                              
    locexp07        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    1.7601e+13   187  9.4125e+10           Root MSE      =  1.2e+05
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8538
    Residual    2.5451e+12   185  1.3757e+10           R-squared     =  0.8554
       Model    1.5056e+13     2  7.5281e+12           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   185) =  547.21
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     188
. reg locexp07 trans06 ownrev06, beta
                                                                              
       _cons     -6581.99   20894.75    -0.32   0.753                        .
     trans06      1.30794   .0428719    30.51   0.000                 .9129317
                                                                              
    locexp07        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    1.7601e+13   187  9.4125e+10           Root MSE      =  1.3e+05
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8325
    Residual    2.9316e+12   186  1.5761e+10           R-squared     =  0.8334
       Model    1.4670e+13     1  1.4670e+13           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   186) =  930.74
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      188
. reg locexp07  trans06 , beta
                                                                              
       _cons     456646.2   22280.63    20.50   0.000                        .
    ownrev06     3.190769   .3524633     9.05   0.000                 .5530348
                                                                              
    locexp07        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    1.7601e+13   187  9.4125e+10           Root MSE      =  2.6e+05
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3021
    Residual    1.2218e+13   186  6.5688e+10           R-squared     =  0.3058
       Model    5.3833e+12     1  5.3833e+12           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   186) =   81.95
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      188
. reg locexp07 ownrev06, beta
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Appendix 5: The effect of Trans2006 and Ownrev2006 to Locexp2006 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                              
       _cons     54819.12   9719.149     5.64   0.000                        .
    ownrev06      1.04968    .089571    11.72   0.000                 .2756607
     trans06     .7563436    .022242    34.01   0.000                 .7998904
                                                                              
    locexp06        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    7.6670e+12   187  4.1000e+10           Root MSE      =   57771
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9186
    Residual    6.1744e+11   185  3.3375e+09           R-squared     =  0.9195
       Model    7.0495e+12     2  3.5248e+12           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   185) = 1056.10
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      188
. reg locexp06 trans06 ownrev06, beta
                                                                              
       _cons     38196.35   12657.56     3.02   0.003                        .
     trans06     .8767144   .0259708    33.76   0.000                 .9271915
                                                                              
    locexp06        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    7.6670e+12   187  4.1000e+10           Root MSE      =   76052
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8589
    Residual    1.0758e+12   186  5.7839e+09           R-squared     =  0.8597
       Model    6.5912e+12     1  6.5912e+12           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   186) = 1139.58
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      188
. reg locexp06 trans06 , beta
                                                                              
       _cons     337776.5   13486.86    25.04   0.000                        .
    ownrev06     2.456278   .2133522    11.51   0.000                 .6450532
                                                                              
    locexp06        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|                     Beta
                                                                              
       Total    7.6670e+12   187  4.1000e+10           Root MSE      =  1.6e+05
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4130
    Residual    4.4768e+12   186  2.4069e+10           R-squared     =  0.4161
       Model    3.1902e+12     1  3.1902e+12           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   186) =  132.54
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      188
. reg locexp06 ownrev06, beta
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Appendix 6: Panel Data Analysis (Sacbas and Saruc model, 2004) 
 
  
                                                                              
         rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    620273.57
     sigma_u            0
                                                                              
       _cons    -365.8427   11670.34    -0.03   0.975    -23239.28     22507.6
         D1.     .8682307   .1020395     8.51   0.000      .668237    1.068224
    transfer  
         D1.     3.980366   1.240349     3.21   0.001     1.549327    6.411405
      Ownrev  
                                                                              
    D.Locexp        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on kodekab)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(2)       =   4284.52
       overall = 0.9462                                        max =         8
       between = 0.8128                                        avg =       5.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.9464                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: kodekab                         Number of groups   =       430
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      2338
. xtreg d.Locexp d.Ownrev d.transfer, re robust
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